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Simon and Theil's certainty equivalence theorem [9^ 10] states
that for a certain class of stochastic control models, the optimal first
period decision can be obtained by replacing all stochastic variables by
their expected values and then finding the optimal decision for the result-
ing deterministic model. One of the assumptions needed for the theorem
to hold is that the decision maker cannot affect the probability distri-
bution of the stochastic elements in the model. In the literature on the
theorem, attempts at making this rather informal statement more precise
have been misleading. Because the theorem has been widely used in applied
studies and has stimulated many theoretical papers, it is important that
the assumption in question be clarified.
The main purpose of this paper is to show that the most recent
formal statement of the assumption [12, p. 130] is stronger than needed.
Indeed, were the conditions given in [12] necessary ones, many applied
studies which use the theorem would be in error (e.g., [2, 3]). In order
to demonstrate that the certainty equivalence theorem holds under a
weaker condition than the one given in [12], we prove the theorem by a
method different from Simon and Theil's. Besides showing exactly what
formal assumption is needed, our proof serves another purpose—out of it
falls a computationally convenient expression for the optimal decision.
In the next section, we review the Theil-Simon model after which
we look at Theil's discussion of the above assumption. A new, formal
statement of the assumption is presented in Section III together with our
proof of the certainty equivalence theorem. Finally, we compare, from the
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point of view of computational ease and generality, various representa-
tions of the optimal strategy.
II. The Theil-Simon Model
Consider a decision maker (for brevity, an agent) who, in each
of T successive periods, has control over an m x 1 vector of variables,
X , t = 1,...,T. Following Theil, these will be called instruments. The
agent's choice for the instruments influences an n x 1 state or non-
controlled vector, y , related to the instruments by
(2.1) y = y R .Xj + s .
't ^ ti i t'
t = 1, .. .,T.
In (2.1), R . is an n X m matrix of known constants and s^ is an
' ti y i t
n X 1 random vector with known mean vector and finite variance-covariance
matrix. Furthermore, and this is the assumption that this paper clarifies,
the decision made by the agent has no effect on the distribution of s .
In matrix notation, (2.1) is
(2.2)
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or
(2.3) y = Rx + s,
where y and s are nT x i, and, if we let m = — ^ m , R is nT x mT
t=l
and x is mT X 1. Most discussions of this model assume that the number
I
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of instruments in each period is a constant; i.e., m = in =»»«= m
Letting the number of instruments vary adds no complexity to the problem.
The agent's utility is measured by the scalar
(2.4) w = a'x + b'y + j (x'Ax + y'By + x'Cy + y'C'x)
where A, B, C, a, and b are matrices and vectors of known constants, and
A and B are symmetric. The agent's goal is to find a strategy or policy
for X that maximizes the expected value of w subject to the constraints
y = Rx + s
.
A strategy is a rule giving each x as a function of the
information the agent has at the end of period t-1. Theil [12, pp. 130-
131] delibrately keeps the notion of information vague. For some problems
the information available at the end of period t-1 will consist of the
realized values of s through s
^
. However, the idea of information is
much more general. Any knowledge that causes the decision maker to revise
his assessment of s would be included in the information that he has at
the beginning of period t. We assume here that all of the information
available at the beginning of period t is contained in the realization of
a random vector, z
_^
. For consistency in notation, we denote the informa-
tion available at the beginning of period 1 by z .
o
It is of interest to ask whether the certainty equivalence
theorem holds if there is information loss. By information loss, we
mean that there is some t and t' ^ t such that z , is not a subvector of
z . The proof in the next section shows that the theorem holds even with
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information loss provided the agent's decisions do not affect the amount of
loss. This result is in contrast with Porter [8, p. 114] who, when
discussing the theorem, explicitly assumes no information loss; and to
Malinvaud [6] who assumes no information loss in order to prove a result
related to the certainty equivalence theorem.
We turn now to a close examination of the assumption that the
agent cannot affect the distribution of s. Theil presents three proofs
of the certainty equivalence theorem [10, 11, 12]. In each succeeding
one, his framing of the assumption is longer and more precise. In his
first proof, he writes only that "the distribution of s is independent of
the instruments" [10]. His second proof enlarges on the last statement:
(2.5) s is independent of the strategy chosen,
. . . Note
however, that the optimal strategy x is not indepen-
dent of s; . . . s is independent of the strategy in
the sense that its distribution is the same for what-
ever X [11, p. 512]
.
While the intention of (2.5) is clear, it can be argued that it is
imprecise because "independent" is used in two different senses. Before
a strategy is chosen, s is independent of x in the sense that the strategy
selected does not affect s. After a strategy is chosen, x is a random
vector and x and s are stochastically dependent.
In his most recent proof, Theil is much more precise:
(2.6) The decision maker can in principle make x
,
, dependent
on s , so that there is then a stochastic dependence
between s-subvectors and later x-subvectors. This pos-
sibility will and, in fact, must be accepted; but we

-5-
shall exclude the possibility that s depends on x t
where t >^ t . More precisely: . . . the distribution
of the subvector s is independent of x i for
t, t' = 1,...,T and t >^ t ' [12, p. 130].
^
While (2.6) may appear to be nothing more than a careful restatement of
(2.5), in actuality, it is much stronger and, as our proof shows, stronger
than needed to prove the theorem. For (2.6) to hold, either the subvec-
tors for different time periods must be temporally independent or there
2
must be severe restrictions on the set of admissable strategies. To
see this, consider a two-period problem in which the only information
available at the end of the first period is the realization of s^ so
that a strategy for x„ is just some function of s . VJhen s and s„ are
dependent, there is no particular reason to believe that the certainty
equivalence strategy will be such that x„ and s„ are independent. In
fact, for many applied studies using the theorem, the certainty equiva-
lence strategy violates (2.6). See, e.g., [2, 3].
III. A New Assumption and a New Proof
Informally, the assumption needed to prove the theorem is that
the agent cannot affect the probability density function (pdf) of s.
In general, the pdf of s at the beginning of period t can depend upon
z
_
(information available at the end of period t-1), x , . .
.
,x
_
(past
decisions), and x (the decision for period t). To say that the agent
cannot affect the pdf of s is to say that the pdf of s conditional on
z
-. is independent of x ,...,x and of x . Formally, we require that
(3.1) f(slz^_j^, x^,...,x^) = f(s|z^_^), t = 1,...,T.
oj
!-i --.Vi
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Assumption (3.1) is all that is needed if the only information the agent
has at the end of period t-1 is s ,...,s
_
. If he has other information,
we also need to assume that he cannot affect the amount of information
available to him. Formally,
(3.2) f (z^,. .. ,z^_^|z^_^, Xj^,...,x^) = f (z^,. .. ,z^_^lz^_^).
The last assumption says that conditional on information available at
the end of period t-l, the information the agent will have at the
beginning of any future period is independent of decisions the agent
has made (x , ...,x
_,) and the decision he is about to make (x ).
Taken together, (3.1) and (3.2) say that the agent's past and
present decisions affect neither the present distribution of s nor
information about s that will be available in the future. Although
(3.1) and (3.2) could be combined, it is didactically useful to keep them
separate.
We now make use of (3.1) and (3.2) to prove the certainty
equivalence theorem. We find both the optimal strategy and the certainty
equivalence strategy by backward induction (i.e., by working backward
from period T; see [5]) and show that the first period decisions for the
two strategies are the same. The following notation will prove useful.
Let
(3.3) x^ = °
o
X
t
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Note that x can be partitioned as x = (x ; x ) . To avoid having
to write lengthy expressions for conditional expectations, let
(3.4) EJO = E("|z^_^, x*""^; x^) ,
where x has been separated by a semicolon to stress that it is x
that the agent must decide upon at the beginning of period t.
It will be convenient to use the constraints to eliminate y
from the welfare function. Substituting (2.3) into (2.4), we have
(3.5) w = p^ + q^x + -^ x'q^x,
where
(3.6) p^ = b's + -Is'bs,
q^ = a + R'b + (C + r'b)s,
Q_ = A + R ER + CR + r'c'.
To find the optimal first period decision, we work backwards from
period T. At the beginning of period T only x remains undetermined and
the agent faces the static problem of choosing x„ to minimize E (w) =
E^(Pj) + E^(q^)x + -2x'q^x. Since p^ and q^ are functions of the random
vector s and of known, constant matrices and since, from (3.1),
f(s|z^_^, x j x^) = f(s|z^_^), we have
1 '.
(3.7) E^(w) = E(p^|z^_^) + E(q^|z^_^)x + - x Q^x
The important point to note about (3.7) is that E(p jz ^) and
E(q |z ) are independent of x and of x .
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Next, we need 9E (w)/8x . To find this derivative, it is con-
venient to write E (w) as a function of x plus terms that are constant
at the beginning of period T. Partition q and Q as
(3.8)
qT
=
f \
*T1
*T2
Q, =
Q^2 ^T3
where q^^ is (mT-m^) x i, q^^ is m^ x l, Q^^ is (mT-m^) x (mT-m^)
,
Q^2 is (mT-m^) x m^, and Q^^ is m^ x m^. Then
T-1 .1 T-1 „ T-1(3.9) E^(w) = E(p^|z^_^) + ECq^j2^_^)x''-' + -i x"'-" Q^^x
rp -I 1
and
(3.10)
9E^(w)
^_^
—^ =E(q^2lVl^ +Qt2^ '^T3^T"
The optimal strategy for x , obtained by setting 3E (x^7)/^x = 0, is
(3.11) \ = -Qx3f^^'5T2' Vl^ "^ Qt2^^"^].^
The last expression gives the optimal decision for period T as a
T-1function of x and z„ , .
T-1
Consider now the decision problem facing the agent at the
beginning of period T-1. By substituting (3.11) into (3.5), x can
be eliminated from the welfare function:
(3.12) Vl Pt-1 ^T-19 T-1 ^ 1 T-1'
T-1
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where a subscript has been used on w to indicate that (3.12) is the wel-
fare function facing the agent at the beginning of period T-1 provided he
follows the strategy given by (3.11) for x ; and where
(3.13) p^_^ " Pt ~ ^T2^T3^^^T2'^T-1^ "^ Y ^^*1t2 ' ^T-1^^T3^^^T2 ' ^T-1^ '
^T-1 " ''tI ~ ^T2^T3'^T2'
-1 «
Vl " ^Tl " ^T2^T3^T2'
At this point, we need E
,(^j_-i^' Consider each random vector
on the right hand side of (3.13). First, p„,
*3ti ' ^^^ ^t9 ^^^ functions
T—
2
of s; by (3.1), f(s|z^_2, x ; \-i^ ^ ^(^I^X-2^ ^° ^^^^ ^^^ pdf's of
P^> q.j,-|^j and q^2 ^^^ independent of x and x • Second, E(q |z^_^) is
T— 2
a function only of z^_^; by (3.2), f(z^_^|z^_,, x ;
^t-1^
""
^^^T-l'^T-2^
T—
2
so that E(q jz ) is independent of x and x • It follows immedi-
itely that E^.^CP^-i) = 2(Px-ilV2^' ^T-l^^T-1^ " E(<1t-1 ' ^T-2^ ' ^nd
(3.14) Vi^"t-1^ = E(p^_Jz^_2) + E(q;_Jz^_2)x^-^
.
1 T-l' T-1
+ ^ X Q^_^x .
Note that both E (w ) and E (w) have the same form.
By induction, it is easy to show that Err,_o(w „),... , E (w ) also
have this form. As a preliminary step, for t = 2,...,T, define
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(3.15) p^_^ = p^ - q;2Q't3^^\2l Vl^ -^ I ^Kz^ ^-iKl^KlK-l^^
^t-1 = ^tl - ^t2^t3^t2"'
Vl = ^tl - ^t2^"t3<2'
where q.,q„, Q,jQ„, and Q are submatrices of q and Q [cf. (3.8)]
The partitioning of q and Q is
(3.16) q^ =
'tl
l^t2j
\ =
'tl
't2
't2
't3
where q ^ is (in +• '"•+in ^ x 1, q is m x 1, Q is (m +» » <>+m ^^
)
X (m, + '>»°+m ,), Q ^ is (m,+°°''+in , ) x m , and Q _ is m x m .1 t-1 ^t2 1 t-1 t t3 t t
We nov; show that for t = 1,..., T-1,
(3.17)
and
-I.
' t ^ 1 t - t
w =p +qx + -^ X Qx
t ^t ^t 2 ^t
t
.
1 t ^ t(3.18) E^(w^) = E(pjz^_^) + E(q^|z^_^)x'^ +^x Q^x
where the subscript on t indicates that w is the welfare function^
t
facing the agent at the beginning of period t provided he follows the
optimal strategy for periods t+l,...,T. Suppose that (3.17) and (3.18)
k-1hold for t=k.. Using (3.16) to write (3.18) as a function of x and x ;
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and setting 3E, (w, )/9x, = 0, we obtain the optimal decision for period k:
(3.19) ^ = -Qk3f^<\2lVl>-^\2-'''j-
Next, substituting (3.19) into (3.17), we can write w as
f-i on^ ^ • k-1 ^ 1 k-l' k-1(3.20) Wj^_^ = pj^_^ + qj^_^x +-X Qj^_^x ,
with p 1 , q, ,, and Q, , defined by (3.16).k— X k— -L i<— 1
Finally, we find E
^^
(w ^). By repeated use of (3.15), it is
evident that p and q ^ can be written as functions of p , q , and
E(qj^2l\-i^'- •'»
^(''x2'^T-l^' ^°" ^T ^^'^ '^T ^^^
functions of s and by
k-2(3.1), the pdf of s (conditional on z ) is independent of x and
\_l- Further, E(q^^\z^_^) , . . . , E(q^2l^T-l^ ^^^ functions of z^_^, . , .
,
H_^ . By (3.2), the joint pdf of z ,,..., z (conditional on z „)
k-2
is independent of x and x^
-. • It follows that (3.18) holds for
t = k-l. Since we have already shown that (3.17) and (3.18) are true for
t = T-1, we have shown that they are true for t = 1, 2,..., T-1. In
particular,
(3.21) E^(w^) = E(p^|z^) + E(q^|z^)x^ + 2 """^ V"""'
The optimal decision for the first period, obtained by recognizing
that x = X and setting BE (w )/8x = 0, is
(3.22) x^ = -Q*^E(q^|2^).
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Consider next the certainty equivalence decision. This is the
decision obtained by replacing s by E(s|z ) in (3.6) and maximizing (3.5)
under certainty. Specifically, let
(3.23) p* = b'E(s|z^) +1 E(s'|z^) BE(s|z ),
q* = a + R'b + (C + r'b)E(s|z ).
Then the certainty equivalence decision is the one that maximizes
(3.24) w* = p* + (q*)'x +|x'q^x.
Partitioning q the same as q was partitioned in (3.8), and setting
8w /9x = 0, we find that the certainty equivalence decision for period
T, say x^, is
(3.25) x^ =
-Q^3(q*2 + Q^a''^'^ •
At this point, it is not hard to see that the inductive proof used to
find the optimal first period decision can be used to find the certainty
equivalence first period decision. The result is
(3.26) x^ =
-^i^^l'
where q is defined recursively by
(3.27)
°'t-l
"
''tl
"
^t2^t3'^t2'
t = 2,...,T.
Comparing (3.26) and (3.22), we see that to complete the proof of the
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certainty equivalence theorenij we need only show that q = E(q |z ).
Let D^ = [I
;
-Qt2^t3^* ^^^"^ ^''°'" ^^•^^^' ^^"^l'^^ = ^3° ° "ViV^'It' ^o^
Similarly, from (3.27), q = D D '-"D D q . Since, from (3.5) and
(3.23), q* = E(q |z ), we have the desired result that q* = E(q |z ).
Thus the first period certainty equivalence decision, x , equals the
optimal first period decision, x , completing the proof.
IV. Concluding remarks
In this section, we compare several representations of the optimal
strategy from the point of view of computational convenience and gen-
erality.
In our algorithm, finding the optimal first period decision
requires inverting the matrices Q„o, Qt,_-, ^, . . . ,^^ - which are of order
m , m ,..,, m^ . Once these inverses are found, the optimal decisions
for periods 2 through T are easily obtained with no further matrix
inversions needed. Algorithms with similar computational requirements
appear in Chow [4] and Aoki [1]. Aoki and Chow use a formulation of
the constraints favored by engineers in which y is expressed as a
function of y , and x . Those economists who are used to Theil's
^t-1 t
formulation as given by (2.2) may find our algorithm more appealing. In
contrast to our algorithm, Theil's seems relatively difficult. Finding
the first period decision by his method requires inverting Q„ which is of
order mT. To find the second period decision requires inverting a matrix
of order mT - m ; in general, the t period decision uses the inverse of
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a matrix of order mT - (m + ° " « + m
_,). Panne [7] develops an
algorithm in which the t period decision can be found by inverting
4
t-1 matrices with orders m , m + m , ..., m + m +'>»+ m ^. Com-
J- 1 Z d. Z t— -L
bining his algorithm with Theil's would be more efficient than either
one alone, with Panne's used for the earlier periods and Theil's for the
later ones.
As regards generality. Chow's algorithm allows for delays in
observing y or in executing decisions. These same features can be
incorporated into both our algorithm and Theil's. Delays in observing
y can be accounted for by defining z appropriately, as discussed in
Theil [12]. Delays in carrying out decisions can be accounted for by
defining x as the set of control variables that must be decided upon at
time t. VJhether those decisions are carried out at time t or at some
later time is immaterial.
One small advantage that our algorithm and Theil's have over
Chow's is that in his, the s-subvectors for different time periods must
be independent or generated by an autoregressive process [4, p. 19].
No such requirement is needed for our algorithm or Theil's although we do
require that E(q jz
_,) be known at the beginning of period t.
To summarize, we have presented a new proof of the certainty
equivalence theorem which clarifies an important assumption needed for the
theorem to hold. In addition, the proof led to a computationally con-
venient algorithm for the optimal strategy. As somewhat minor by-products,
the proof shows that the number of instruments can vary from period to
period and that the agent can lose information provided he cannot control
the loss.
:-<U;-
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Footnotes
Panne [7] states the assumption in essentially the same way
as (2.6).
2
This was pointed out to me by A. S. Goldberger.
3 -1
If Q „ is not of full rank, Q can be interpreted as a gen-
eralized inverse. This rema/k also holds for (3.19), below.
4Panne assumes that the number of instruments per period is a
constant, m. In his notation the largest matrix to be inverted for the
t period's decision is of order m(t-l). His claim [7, p. 314] that
it is or order t-1 appears to be a typographical error.





